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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Jessie Trevino Salinas, pled guilty to one count of
possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver. Mr. Salinas reluctantly pled guilty and,
upon further reflection, decided he desired additional time to assess his case. He believed a
motion to suppress may be a viable option because his traffic stop was prolonged in order to
allow a drug dog to arrive, and because the Idaho Supreme Court had just issued its decision in
State v. Fuller, 163 Idaho 585 (2018) (holding crossing the fog line does not constitute a
violation of I.C. § 49-637(1)), and Mr. Salinas was stopped, in part, for driving onto the fog line.
Thus, he filed a motion to withdraw his plea. The district court denied Mr. Salinas’ presentencing motion to withdraw his guilty plea and sentenced him to ten years, with four years
fixed.
On appeal, Mr. Salinas contends the district court erred in denying his motion to
withdraw his guilty plea because he presented a “just reason” to withdraw his plea, as he wished
to assert what he believed were viable defenses to the charges.
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State’s arguments which fail to acknowledge
newly decided controlling precedent in State v. Sunseri, 2018 WL 5628898, and which fall short
of demonstrating the correctness of the district court’s decision denying Mr. Salinas’s motion to
withdraw his plea.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Salinas’s Appellant’s Brief.

They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are

incorporated herein by reference thereto.

1

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Salinas’ motion to withdraw his guilty
plea?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Denying Mr. Salinas’ Motion To Withdraw His
Guilty Plea Where Mr. Salinas Established “Just Reason” To Withdraw The Plea
In his Appellant’s Brief, Mr. Salinas relied heavily upon State v. Sunseri, 2018 WL
5628898 (Idaho Oct. 31, 2018), a recent Idaho Supreme Court decision regarding the withdrawal
of a guilty plea prior to sentencing. In Sunseri, the Court set forth four non-exclusive factors the
court must consider in determining whether a defendant has shown a just reason to withdraw his
plea:
(1) Whether the defendant has credibly asserted his legal innocence; (2) the length
of delay between the entry of the guilty plea and the filing of the motion; (3)
whether the defendant had the assistance of competent counsel at the time of the
guilty plea; and (4) whether withdrawal of the plea will inconvenience the court
and waste judicial resources.
Sunseri, at *4.
The Sunseri Court explained:
The just reason standard does not require that the defendant establish a
constitutional defect in his or her guilty plea. Once the defendant has met this
burden, the state may avoid a withdrawal of the plea by demonstrating the
existence of prejudice to the state. The defendant’s failure to present and support
a plausible reason will dictate against granting withdrawal, even absent prejudice
to the prosecution.
Id. (quoting State v. Hartsock, 160 Idaho 639, 641 (Ct. App. 2016)) (citations omitted).
The State does not even acknowledge Sunseri. Rather, it relies on an older Court of
Appeals decision, State v. Hartsock, for the holding that there was not a just reason allow the
defendant to withdraw her guilty plea were she “offered no reason why her pronouncement of
innocence was not previously maintained and did not provide sufficient basis for her requested
withdrawal of her plea beyond a profession of innocence and regret.” (Resp. Br., p.10.) But the
Idaho Supreme Court’s decision in Sunseri considered the credible assertion of legal innocence
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as but one of at least four factors to be considered by the trial court in determining whether a
defendant has established just reason to withdraw his plea. The State’s reliance on outdated case
law is improvident, especially where the thrust of the State’s argument is that “[t]he district court
correctly held that the mere desire to raise defenses that were available at the time and
voluntarily relinquished in a plea does not constitute just reason to withdraw the plea.” (Resp.
Br., p.11.)
Here, Mr. Salinas sought to withdraw his plea to credibly assert his legal innocence, thus
satisfying the first of the four factors identified by the Sunseri Court. Thus, Mr. Salinas’s stated
reasons that he would like to withdraw his guilty plea—so that he may consider available
defenses and to file suppression motions because of the traffic stop and the delay in the drug
dog’s arrival—should have been considered by the trial court in its determination of whether he
had established just reason to withdraw his plea. In determining whether a “just reason” existed
to allow the withdrawal, the court looked at whether Mr. Salinas was asserting his innocence,
and why that claim of innocence was not maintained earlier. (R., pp.90-91.) However, the trial
court relied on State v. Akin, 139 Idaho 160, 163 (Ct. App. 2003), in concluding that Mr. Salinas
did not assert factual innocence, and that “the desire to exercise rights that have been waived is
insufficient reason to allow the withdrawal of a guilty plea.”

(R., p.91.)

However, this

conclusion is inconsistent with Idaho Supreme Court precedent 1 where, in Sunseri, the Court
determined that whether the defendant has “credibly asserted his legal innocence” was one of the
factors the court should consider in determining whether a defendant has shown a just reason for

1

Mr. Salinas acknowledges that the trial court in his case did not have the benefit of the Sunseri
decision, which was decided after the trial court denied Mr. Salinas’s motion to withdraw his
guilty plea, but while Mr. Salinas’s case was pending on appeal. Nonetheless, controlling case
law must be applied to the facts of Mr. Salinas’s case.
4

withdrawing his plea. Sunseri, at *4 (emphasis added). Thus, the district court’s focus solely on
whether Mr. Salinas had asserted and continuously maintained his factual innocence in
determining whether just reason had been shown was an abuse of discretion for failing to act
consistently with the applicable legal standards.
The district court also reviewed the probable cause affidavit of the officer conducting the
stop to determine that part of the reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop was that Mr. Salinas
had driven with both tires over the fog line for over 100 feet. (R., p.91.) The court noted that the
officer also asserted that Mr. Salinas failed to use his turn signal, which provided an independent
basis for the stop; thus, Fuller did not create a just reason for withdrawing the plea. (R., p.91.)
However, there had been no suppression hearing, and no evidence presented—the court was
merely speculating after reading the probable cause affidavit as to what facts would be
introduced at such a hearing. Further, the district court entirely failed to address the other
reasons why Mr. Salinas sought to withdraw his plea—that the officers delayed the duration of
the traffic stop to allow additional time for the drug dog to arrive, arrested Mr. Salinas without a
finding of probable cause, and destroyed the controlled substance when testing it. Mr. Salinas
filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, because he had become aware of multiple bases for a
motion to suppress, and possible defenses to the charges. (R., pp.81-82.)
As for the second Sunseri factor—the length of delay between the entry of the guilty plea
and the filing of the motion, Mr. Salinas promptly moved to withdraw his plea. He pled guilty
on February 26, 2018, and his motion was filed on May 31, 2018, shortly after the decision in
Fuller was published. (R., pp.43-44, 81-83.) The third Sunseri factor—whether the defendant
had the assistance of competent counsel at the time of the guilty plea was not analyzed, although
the record indicates that Mr. Salinas was represented by counsel at the proceeding. As for the
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fourth and final factor the Sunseri Court deemed relevant to a determination of whether “just
cause” was satisfied, “whether withdrawal of the plea will inconvenience the court and waste
judicial resources,” the court did not appear to consider this factor in making its decision. (See
R., pp.87-92.)
The district court was concerned that Mr. Salinas was “test[ing] the waters” where it
believed that Mr. Salinas may have violated a term and condition of the plea agreement;
therefore, the State might assert that it was not bound to follow the plea agreement and might ask
for an increased sentence. (R., p.91.) However, none of these speculative facts had come to
fruition at the time Mr. Salinas moved to withdraw his plea. Mr. Salinas had not “received other
information about the probable sentence,” State v. Hartsock, 160 Idaho 639, 641 (Ct. App.
2016), and although he likely suspected that the State would not be bound by the plea agreement,
he had received no additional information that the State would be asking for a different, or even a
significantly higher, sentence. Although the district court’s focus was primarily on the fact that
Mr. Salinas had not shown up for a hearing, which might have removed the State’s obligation to
make a specific sentencing recommendation, there was no additional information from the State
that it would not be recommending the agreed-upon sentence. (See 6/11/18 Tr.) Further, the
Sunseri Court did not set forth any discussion regarding the effect on the district court’s decision
of whether the defendant had learned of the content of the PSI or received other information
about the probable sentence when it set forth how the trial court must analyze motions to
withdraw guilty pleas. That is, the Sunseri Court did not state that the court may “temper its
liberality” if the defendant had received other information regarding the probable sentence. See
Hartsock, 160 Idaho at 641.
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In this case, the district court placed too onerous a burden on Mr. Salinas when he sought
to withdraw his plea at this stage in the proceedings. Mr. Salinas was not required to show his
plea was not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary; the just reason standard does not require that the
defendant establish a constitutional defect in his or her guilty plea.

See Sunseri at *4.

Mr. Salinas has established multiple bases for suppression and evidentiary issues, which, if
successful, would have resulted in his legal innocence; there was a reasonably short length of
delay between the entry of the guilty plea and the filing of the motion; and withdrawal of the plea
would not have inconvenienced the court or wasted judicial resources. See Id. Further, while
“the good faith, credibility, and weight of the defendant’s assertions in support of his motion to
withdraw his plea are matters for the trial court to decide,” “[t]he trial court is encouraged to
liberally exercise its discretion in granting a motion to withdraw a guilty plea.” Id. Where
Mr. Salinas had not yet seen the PSI, and where he asserted that, at the time he plead guilty he
was very reluctant to waive his defenses, and had further considered case law, he desired to
withdraw the plea to assert those defenses and attempt to suppress the evidence, the district court
should have allowed him to withdraw his plea.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Salinas respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court’s order denying
his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and remand for further proceedings.
DATED this 5th day of April, 2019.

/s/ Sally J. Cooley
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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